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Chapter  8
INTRODUCTION
The free pool of IPv4 address space will be depleted 
soon. On 3 February 2011, the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA) (2012, March 14) al-
located the last remaining blocks of IPv4 address 
space to the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). 
Therefore, the world is responding by transitioning 
from IPv4 to IPv6. On 8 June 2011, top websites 
and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) around the 
world joined together with more than 1000 other 
participating websites in a “World IPv6 Day”. 
Because of the success of this global-scale event, 
the Internet Society organized the “World IPv6 
Launch Day” on 6 June 2012 (Internet Society, 
2012). On this day major ISPs and companies 
around the world permanently enabled IPv6 for 
their products and services.
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ABSTRACT
SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) was proposed to counteract threats to the Neighbor Discovery 
Protocol (NDP). It is a strong security extension that can make the IPv6 local link very safe. SEND 
relies on dynamically Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) and X.509 certificates. However, 
SEND is not easily deployed and is still vulnerable to some types of attacks. This chapter evaluates the 
practical considerations of a SEND deployment taking a cryptographic approach as a means of securing 
the IPv6 local link operations. It reviews the remaining vulnerabilities and gives some recommendations 
with which to facilitate SEND deployment.
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SEcure Neighbor Discovery
However, businesses need to migrate to IPv6 
in a secure manner in order to avoid the possible 
security risks inherent in an IPv6 deployment. 
One of the security concerns comes from the new 
IPv6 features and mechanisms, which can expose 
the network to new security threats. For instance, 
StateLess Address Auto-Configuration (SLAAC) 
(Thomson, Narten, & Jinmei, 2007) and Neighbor 
Discovery (ND) (Narten, Nordmark, Simpson, & 
Soliman, 2007) messages are essential portions of 
the IPv6 suite. Both ND and SLAAC, together, are 
known as Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP). 
IPv6 nodes use NDP for several critical functions: 
to discover other nodes (routers/hosts) on the link, 
to find the mapping between the MAC and link 
local addresses, to detect duplicate addresses, 
and to maintain reachability information about 
the paths to active neighbors. Also, NDP plays 
a crucial role in mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) networks 
(Perkins, Johnson, & Arkko, 2011). However, NDP 
is vulnerable to spoofing and Denial-of-Service 
(DoS) attacks (Nikander, Kempf, & Nordmark, 
2004) and attackers have already developed a set 
of tools to use in attacking ND functionalities 
(Hauser, 2012).
NDP specifications do not include any security 
provisions. It was designed to work in trustworthy 
links where all nodes on the link trust each other. 
However, we cannot assume that being on the 
same network is trustworthy as this assumption 
does not hold in number of different scenarios, 
such as, over wireless networks, where anyone can 
join a local link either with minimal or with no 
link layer authentication. Today people use public 
networks such as Wireless LAN at airports, hotels, 
and cafes, where a malicious user can imperson-
ate legitimate nodes by forging NDP messages to 
generate serious attacks. RFC 3756 (Nikander, et 
al., 2004) shows a list of potential threats to NDP. 
Therefore, if NDP is not secured, it will be vulner-
able to these various attacks. Some such attacks 
are Neighbor Solicitation (NS)/ Advertisement 
(NA) spoofing, Neighbor Unreachability Detec-
tion (NUD) faller, Duplicate Address Detection 
(DAD), Denial of Service (DoS), Malicious Last 
Hop Router, Spoofed Redirect Message, Bogus 
On-Link Prefix, Parameter Spoofing, and Replay 
attacks.
Therefore, RFC 3971 “SEcure Neighbor Dis-
covery (SEND)” (Arkko, Kempf, Zill, & Nikander, 
2005) was proposed as a set of enhancements to 
make the IPv6 neighbor and router discovery 
secure. SEND was designed to ensure message 
integrity, prevent IPv6 address theft, prevent replay 
attacks, and provide a mechanism for verifying 
the authority of routers. It uses Cryptographically 
Generated Addresses (CGA) (Aura, 2005), digital 
signature, and X.509 certification (Lynn, Kent, & 
Seo, 2004) to offer significant protection for NDP. 
A SEND-enabled node must generate or obtain 
a public-private key pair before it can claim an 
address. Then it generates the CGA address based 
on the public key and other auxiliary parameters. 
The associated private key is used to sign the out-
going ND messages from that address. For router 
authorization, every router must have a certificate 
from a trust anchor and the hosts provisioned 
with a trust anchor(s) list and picks routers that 
can show a valid certificate from a trust anchor. 
The SEND verifier node checks that the received 
address is a hash of the corresponding public key 
and that the signature, from the associated private 
key, is valid. If both verifications are successful, 
then the verifiers know that the address is not a 
stolen address and that it is from the address cor-
responding to public private key pairs.
Although SEND is considered to be a promis-
ing technique with which to protect NDP and to 
make IPv6 a very safe protocol, its deployment 
is not easy and thus is very challenging. SEND 
lacks mature implementations by developers of 
operating systems. It is compute-intensive and 
bandwidth-consuming. Moreover, SEND itself 
can be vulnerable to some types of attacks.
This chapter will introduce SEND functional-
ities and messages, discuss the practical consid-
erations of SEND deployment as a cryptography 
solution in securing IPv6 local networks, survey 
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